

NSC

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060014-5

9 July 53

25X1

Outline: Events in Germany and their implications

I. The analysis of East German uprisings

while not final, is valuable.

A. It is based on information available as of 2 July

II. East Zone uprising began spontaneously on 16 June

A. It was launched on a small scale by working class

1. Regime winked at early demonstration

B. Uprising grew as other segments of population joined
workers

III. Early intervention by E. German police was ineffective

A. Soviets interceded after quickly deciding that
situation was getting out of hand

1. This indicated distrust of effectiveness of
People's Police

IV. Potentially revolutionary situation developed, based on:

A. Widespread hatred of regime and its organs

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060014-5

DOCUMENT NO. 18
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1-2-80
AUTH: HR 20-2
DATE: 1-2-80
REVIEWER:

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060014-5

- Please 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79R0

- C. Shop stewards and revolutionary tradition of German trade union movement played vital role in leadership**
 - 1. "Yes" Soviet methods had affracted pride of German worker**

- VI. East German developments demonstrate possibility of revolt from below even in communist police state**
 - A. Kremlin must forestall similar development in Satellites**
 - B. Soviet propaganda consequently alleges riots engineered from outside**
 - C. "Uprising from below" theme useful in psychological warfare**
 - 1. SED authority based on Soviet bayonets**
 - 2. SED as instrument for repressing workers**
 - 3. Soviet troops, "protectors of workers," used against them**
 - 4. Communism, repressing revolution, is really reactionary**

VII. Riots have created problems of great magnitude for the USSR

A. Kremlin must now question value of East Germany as

a base for an offensive against Western Europe

1. Lines of communication could not be protected

by Germans in event of major war

B. New economic program of SED could terminate in

reduction of Soviet control over East Zone populace

C. Demonstrated hostility of East Germans reduces

usefulness of East Germany as a base for subverting

West Germany

1. Appeal of communism to West Germans has vanished

D. Potency of unity campaign has diminished

E. The SED cannot now muster mass popular support

1. Eventually may be reduced to cadre organization

2. Reports of coming ascendancy of bourgeois parties

at this stage are, however, wishful and premature.

a) they may, nevertheless, be brought more to the

fore

3. Attempts to broaden the popular base of the SED

are likely

F. Ulbricht's future position is uncertain

1. It appears, however, that his continued influence

is assured

VIII. The Kremlin, it would seem must now:

A. Maintain the SED in power; there is no other logical
choice

1. No major change expected in SED conciliatory
tactics

B. Make every effort to restore order before any four-
power conference is proposed

C. Maintain covert nucleus of communist control within
East German bourgeois parties

1. This would be done in any case, but would prepare

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060014-5

for remote contingency or settlement on Western

terms

2. Long range prospects for success of this maneuver

are not good

IX. This analysis covers immediate German situation; broader implications exist

A. Can an alien, and hostile, people be held by force alone?

B. How far can concessions go, as an alternative, without sacrifice of control? This is the dilemma

I. The current situation in the Eastern European Satellites

A. Press reports of large scale demonstrations in Poland are denied by US officials in Warsaw.

1.

no evidence of

demonstrations or heightened security

B. Reports of strikes and demonstrations in other Satellites are unconfirmed and probably untrue

C. The Hungarian, Albania, and Rumanian regimes announced concessions following the East German riots

**1. Timing may have been influenced by German events;
no other apparent connection**

**2. Hungarian government and party reorganization in
line with Kremlin's new conciliatory policy**

**D. Reorganization of Hungarian regime apparently ends
Rakosi's one-man rule**

1. Resembles reorganization in USSR and Czechoslovakia

**2. Rakosi retains principal Politburo and
Secretariat posts, but his job as Secretary General
has been abolished, and he has dropped from the
government**

**3. Long-time communist Imre Nagy promoted to
premierhip**

4. Former number-two man Erno Gero remains on

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060014-5

Politburo and gets additional duties as First

Deputy Premier and Minister of Interior

B. New regime promises:

a) Slowdown in industrialization and collectivization

b) Abolition of internment camps

c) Rise in living standards

E. Albania on 22 June cancelled peasants' agricultural

debts for 1949-1952

F. Romania has relaxed grain collection program and

furnished additional foodstuffs to the people

G. The Czech Government on 6 July repealed a week-old

decree specifying stringent measures to combat

absenteeism

H. These developments may presage a softer policy through-

out the Orbit.